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Abstract 
 
Ad hoc networks of autonomous vehicles endowed with inter-vehicular communication (IVC) capabilities are 
in our future. Avoidance of accidents in safety-critical (SC) scenarios is a major concern. We show that IVCs can 
“solve” safety-related problems that are not within the grasp of sensing/robotics. A rigorous definition of SC IVCs 
is given, based on the Bounded Move (BM) requirements. Longitudinal SC scenarios in ad hoc strings and lateral 
inter-string SC scenarios as they arise on highways are examined. Since current WAVE standards (IEEE 802.11p, 
ETSI ITS-G5) fail to meet the BM requirements by huge margins, novel solutions are sought. We present the 
cohort construct—a string with a specification, a deterministic MAC protocol that also achieves fast string-wide 
message dissemination, and two distributed agreement algorithms. Worst-case time bounds achieved by these 
solutions are given, showing that they meet the BM requirements. Anonymity issues are briefly addressed.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Vehicular networks range from platoons with a lead vehicle piloted by a human driver to open ad-hoc vehicular 
networks, a.k.a. VANETs, comprising communicating autonomous vehicles. Safety issues appear to be the least 
studied in this area. The focus of our work is on safety-critical (SC) scenarios, where severe accidents (severe 
injuries and fatalities) inevitably occur when such scenarios are not handled correctly. In addition to on-board 
sensing/robotics, IVCs are considered for achieving safety properties. Since both technologies have known 
intrinsic limitations (in addition to experiencing temporary or permanent failures), using them redundantly is 
mandatory for meeting safety regulations. We show that IVCs can “solve” safety-related problems that are not 
within the grasp of sensing/robotics. We consider VANETs on highways, which are settings where velocities can 
be very high, thus exacerbating safety problems—acceptable delays in cyber space, and response times in the 
physical space, shall be very small. Human lives being at stake, delays in cyber space must have strict and 
proven upper bounds under worst-case conditions (vehicular density, channel contention, concurrency and 
failures). We are thus led to look for deterministic solutions, radically different from today’s WAVE standards. 
Upper bound for MAC access delays (resp., message dissemination or agreement delays) is denoted λ (resp., Δ). 
 
2 Safe automated driving on highways and today’s WAVE standards 
 
In the current ITS literature, the term “safety” is used without being given a precise definition. That must be 
corrected. In our case, a fundamental open question is: What is the exact meaning of “safety criticality”? We 
have devised unambiguous definitions, stated as the Bounded Move (BM) requirements—see Subsection 3.1. 
Via discussions with foreign colleagues active in the IEEE 802 Committee, we have comforted our early 
diagnosis regarding today’s WAVE standards for V2X communications (IEEE 802.11p and ETSI ITS-G5): 
designed for providing “best effort” V2V and V2I communications (mobile access to Internet and cloud services 
(infotainment, weather data, traffic conditions, etc.)), they are inappropriate for the handling of SC IVCs. A 
major weakness lies with CSMA/CA (MAC-level protocol). Obviously, there cannot be such bounds as λ and Δ 
with CSMA/CA. Moreover, stochastic average delays in moderate/worst-case contention conditions are 
exceedingly high, due to medium-range omnidirectional communications, radio (resp., interference) range in the 
order of 250 m (resp., 400 m). Consider the following highway setting, not uncommon at pick hours in many 
countries: 3 lanes each direction and dense traffic (1 vehicle per 12.5 m). A simple calculation leads to the 
following result: any vehicle may experience (destructive) interferences from up to 384 vehicles. Even if one 
assumes some “reasonable” communications activity ratio, say 25%, one finds that up to 96 vehicles may be 
contending for channel access. Under such conditions, current WAVE standards fail to meet the BM 
requirements by huge margins. This is shown in [Y13] where MAC delays induced by the IEEE 802.11p 
protocol are evaluated via analytical modeling and NS-2 simulations. For various channel loads, assuming 1 
vehicle every 12 m, highest stochastic delays range between 75.3 ms and 211.8 ms. Requirement BM0 is not met 
with such values for λ (worst-case delays are theoretically unbounded). Lack of acknowledgements with 
multicast and broadcast communications is another major weakness. It is simply impossible to argue about safety 
(even less to prove safety) when a sender does not know whether a message carrying SC data has been correctly 
delivered to intended recipients or has been lost. Reliance on V2I communications via terrestrial infrastructures 
and nodes, such as road-side units (WAVE, WiFi, LTE or 5G relays), rather than direct V2V communications, 
can only lead to poorer results. Reachability is not guaranteed since SC conditions may develop anywhere 
anytime, far away from a terrestrial node. Mixing SC communications and ordinary communications within 
terrestrial nodes is a violation of the very fundamental segregation/isolation principle in SC applications. 
Security threats are safety threats since it is very easy to jam or to spy on a terrestrial node. Moreover, terrestrial 
nodes may be used for launching all sorts of attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks for example. Delays can only get 
worse than with direct V2V communications, since transiting via a node inevitably introduces additional 
latencies. The delivery of every SC message must be acknowledged, which exacerbates the latency problems. 
What happens when a terrestrial node fails? Trying to tweak existing WAVE standards is vain and unjustified. 
Since collisions can only involve vehicles that are very close to each other, short-range directional 
communications suffice. Novel solutions for SC IV communications and SC IV coordination are briefly 
presented in Subsections 3.2 and 3.3. Message passing with these solutions is anonymous—see Subsection 3.4. 
Future standards specifically aimed at SC IVCs may emerge from solutions similar to those presented herein. 
 
3 Recent results 
 
Solutions to safety related problems necessarily rest on worst-case analyses. They can only be conducted with 
constructs that have specifications, also necessary for reasoning about (and proving) properties. Cohorts—strings 
with a specification [LL15], appear to be an early example of cyber-physical constructs appropriate for ad hoc 
vehicular networks. The cohort concept, originally devised for minimizing the number of vehicles involved in a 
collective rear-end collision, has proven to be fruitful regarding safety-related problems in general. A cohort that 
moves at velocity v cannot comprise more than n*(v) members [LL15]. In [LL16], we have refined this concept 
as follows, so as to mirror real mobility patterns: n*(v) is an inverse function of v, i.e. the fastest the smallest (or 
vice versa). Which we write as follows: v.n*(v) ≤ b. Values of bound b may be part of future standards aimed at 
safety. (String and cohort are used interchangeably in the sequel.)  
 
3.1 The Bounded Move (BM) requirements 
Safety related problems would receive trivial solutions if one could assume that vehicles involved in a SC 
scenario do not move while messages are being exchanged. Since this is unrealistic, the best we can aim at is to 
quantify distances travelled in worst-case conditions. That is the purpose of the BM requirements, where σ 
stands for the smallest “car slot” (σ = smallest car size + smallest IV gap), i.e. 7 m approximately: 
- BM0: a MAC protocol is acceptable only if the distance travelled in λ time units by any vehicle is significantly 
smaller than σ. 
- BM1: a string-wide acknowledged message dissemination algorithm is acceptable only if the distance travelled 
in Δd time units by any vehicle is smaller than σ. 
- BM2: a string-wide or an inter-string agreement algorithm is acceptable only if the distance travelled in Δa time 
units by any vehicle is smaller than 2σ. 
Solutions to safety related problems that come with no worst-case time bounds simply cannot be trusted, since it 
is impossible to tell whether they meet such requirements or any others equally constraining and unambiguous. 
Bounds λ and Δ are established by resorting to analytical calculus. Simulations are irrelevant. Our solutions can 
be compared against other protocols/algorithms only if their worst-case time bounds are given (not our duty), be 
they obtained by analytical calculus, asymptotic analyses, or (max,+) algebra—to name a few possibilities. 
3.2 SWIFT: A deterministic MAC protocol and an efficient algorithm for string-wide 
dissemination of acknowledged messages 
In cohorts, members assign themselves consecutive integers, called ranks, starting from 1 for an isolated vehicle. 
See [LL15-LL17] for how ranks are computed whenever cohort membership is modified. SWIFT, a collision-
free MAC protocol, is based on member ranking and small beamwidth directional RF antennas that are power 
controlled [BJ12]. They can be built out of WAVE conformant omnidirectional antennas. The level of power 
used by a vehicle that transmits a 1-hop LOS neighbor-to-neighbor (N2N) message to its predecessor or its 
successor is a function of the gap (approx. a 2-15 m range) with the targeted neighbor. Short range power control 
does not eliminate interferences with vehicles beyond a targeted neighbor. Via a worst-case analysis, one finds h, 
the highest number of contiguous members that are within the interference range of a transmitter. Integer h is a 
measurement of spatial reuse. Lobes of small beamwidth antennas may encompass adjacent lanes. This is taken 
into account in the design of SWIFT, which rests on a slotted channel, aligned to UTC, thanks to GPS receivers, 
backed by on-board clocks. Cheap clocks suffice, since drifts need not be small. Channel slot allocation is 
conducted according to ranks. Every member owns 2 slots per frame (2h slots in each frame), h slots serviced 
downstream, followed by h slots serviced upstream. Members which own the same rank modulo h can transmit 
in the same time slot, in the same direction, without interfering with each other. Since h is a small integer, spatial 
reuse is good. Fast symmetrical string-wide dissemination of acknowledged N2N messages mandates that the 
ordering of channel accesses must match the ranking and the counter-ranking of members, which is not feasible 
with CSMA/CA or TDMA protocols—SWIFT is not equivalent to conventional TDMA [H15]. 
Acknowledgements of N2N messages sent in one direction are piggybacked on N2N messages flowing in the 
opposite direction, entailing a negligible overhead. String-wide message dissemination serves to build common 
knowledge, which is essential for achieving SC IV coordination. We have established the following bounds: 
- Worst-case channel access delay:     λ = 2hθ, θ standing for the largest message transmission duration. 
- Worst-case string-wide acknowledged message dissemination delay in the presence of f faulty N2N links, for a 
string comprising n members and moving at velocity v:    Δd(n,f) = 2hθ {f +1+ (n-1)/h}, n ≤ n*(v). 
Considering conservative numerical figures (h = 4, θ = 1 ms), one finds λ = 8 ms, i.e. 0.56 m for v = 250 km/h 
(highest velocity referred to in WAVE standards). Requirement BM0 is met.  
Valuation of bound b is not arbitrary. With v in km/h, and n*(250) = 4 (highest number of rear-end collisions in 
“brick wall” conditions), we have b ≤ 1,000. Let us check Δd for two extreme cases: v = 180 (n* = 5) and v = 10 
(n* = 100). Assuming up to 1 loss (message or acknowledgement) per N2N link, not leading to a string split, we 
have f < n*. One finds (dist standing for distance travelled): 
              Δd(5,4) = 48 ms, and dist ≤ 2.4 m;           Δd(100,99) = 1 s, and dist ≤ 2.78 m. 
Requirement BM1 is met, despite the fact that every N2N message must be sent twice. Assuming no losses, we 
find:       Δd(5,0) = 16 ms, and dist ≤ 0.8 m;            Δd(100,0) = 208 ms, and dist ≤ 0.58 m. 
Note the significant reductions in distances travelled. This shows that results regarding safe or/and “cooperative 
driving” with IVCs (e.g., CACC) based on ignoring message losses are of limited practical relevance. 
 
3.3 Time-bounded distributed agreements 
Eligo and LHandshake [LL17] are distributed agreement algorithms aimed at achieving safe IV coordination in 
the presence of concurrent conflicting events and/or inputs to agreement, referred to as “proposals”. Time-
bounded agreement (TBA) problems arise whenever p members, 1 < p ≤ n, issue conflicting proposals 
concurrently, entailing unfeasible maneuvers (e.g., acceleration request(s) and string split request, or deceleration 
request(s) and string insertion request(s)). (Concurrency issues are almost totally ignored in the literature devoted 
to IV coordination.) All string members shall reach the same decision D in bounded time, at UTC times 
comprised within an interval of size ε. Stipulated properties are as follows: 
- Validity: Decision value D = Ψ{proposed values}.   
- Agreement: No two members decide differently.  
- Time-Bounded Termination: Every member decides in at most Δa time units.  
- Synchronicity: ε shall be such that the difference between distances travelled by the member earliest to post D 
and the latest to do so is an order of magnitude smaller than σ. 
Ψ stands for any appropriate function in cyber-physics. Eligo (I choose in Latin), which builds on SWIFT, solves 
the TBA problem in strings, achieving bound Δa denoted Δswa. LHandshake, which builds on Eligo, solves the 
TBA problem as it arises in sets of strings circulating in adjacent lanes, achieving bound Δa denoted Δisa. 
Extending the results given in [LL17], we have    Δswa(n,f,p)  =  2hθ {1+p+2[f + (n-1)/h}. 
Assume p = (n/10. Let us check that Eligo meets BM2 in both cases. 
      v = 180 km/h:         Δswa(5,0,1) = 32 ms, and dist ≤ 1.6;            Δswa(5,4,1) = 96 ms, and dist ≤ 4.8. 
    v = 10 km/h:      Δswa(100,0,10) = 488 ms, and dist ≤ 1.36;     Δswa(100,99,10) = 2.072 s, and dist ≤ 5.76. 
● Worst-case lateral inter-String agreement delays. Let g stand for the number of consecutive members that must 
reach agreement, e.g., that receive an insertion request from an adjacent vehicle (g < 5 in realistic cases). We 
have shown that LHandshake achieves Δisa(g,f,p) = 2σmax+Δswa(g,f,p), where σmax stands for the worst-case delay 
involved with transmitting and delivering a V2V message (a join request, a response), MAC access delay 
included. Whether LHandshake meets the BM2 requirement depends fully on σmax, which may take unbounded 
values with WAVE standards. Novel protocols for lateral V2V communications are sought (on-going work).  
 
The broadcasting of medium-range omnidirectional V2V messages is believed to suffice for coping with non-
LOS SC scenarios, e.g., accidents. Alas, the reliable broadcast problem has no time-bounded solutions—the case 
with VANETs (see Section 2). Something else is needed for coordinating the behaviors of vehicles heading 
toward crashed vehicles (brutal braking and random lane changes lead to more accidents) or crossing an 
intersection with no traffic lights safely and efficiently. For the latter case, circumventing impossibility results 
appears feasible with cyber-physical solutions (the cohort construct and hybrid radio/optical communications). 
 
3.4  Naming and anonymity 
IP/MAC addresses appear in WAVE conformant V2V messages. Periodic beaconing (1-10 Hz) is based on 
assuming that beacons are delivered reliably, and in time (to be useful), a flawed assumption. The building of 
inaccurate “maps” of proximate vehicles contributes to overloading communication channels and on-board 
computers. There are better ways for building situational awareness. Finally, doing this amounts to breaching 
anonymity voluntarily. Every vehicle reveals its existence and time-dependent geolocations to unknown 
recipients within a disc of radius in the order of 250 m, making tracking, spying and hacking much easier. 
Solutions based on pseudonyms issued by a trustable third party (a cloud-based authentication body) cannot be 
considered either: they rest on V2I communications, and they suffer from known limitations [W10]. Names that 
appear in N2N messages are integers (member ranks). There is no possible linkage between such names and 
identifiers proper to a vehicle (IP/MAC addresses, plate number). Moreover, rank/vehicle mappings change 
arbitrarily often in ad hoc vehicular strings. Consequently, tracking, spying or hacking are hardly feasible, only 
by an adjacent vehicle within the directional lobe of the targeted “victim”. Which eavesdropper would be 
interested in learning that an adjacent string decides to set its velocity to 55 km/h? Authentication issues do not 
arise within a string (no masquerading is feasible with ranks). Across strings, there are simple solutions based on 
hybrid radio/optical communications. None of these properties hold with today’s WAVE standards.  
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